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importing countries in the World Trade Organization system use to restrict international trade. While such 
trade remedies are also frequent targets of dispute settlement activity under the WTO, given that Panel and 
Appellate Body rulings have almost invariably found that some aspect of each reviewed remedy was 
inconsistent with WTO obligations, an open research question is why aren’t more remedies targeted by 
dispute settlement? This paper provides a first empirical investigation of the trade remedy and WTO dispute 
settlement interaction by focusing on determinants of WTO members’ decisions of whether to formally 
challenge U.S. trade remedies imposed between 1992 and 2003. We provide evidence that it is not only the 
size of the economic market at stake and the capacity to retaliate under potential Dispute Settlement 
Understanding-authorized sanctions that influence the litigation decision of whether to formally challenge a 
measure at the WTO. We also find that if the negatively affected foreign industry has the capacity to 
directly retaliate through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and measure of its own, its government is 
less likely to pursue the case on its behalf at the WTO. This is consistent with the theory that potential 
complainants may be avoiding WTO litigation in favor of pursuing reciprocal antidumping and hence 
“vigilante justice.” 
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1 Introduction   
Antidumping and other national trade remedy laws such as countervailing duties and safeguards occupy an 
uneasy position in the GATT/WTO system. National governments have been explicitly authorized under various 
GATT and WTO Agreements to implement such laws and to set up procedures through which domestic industries 
and/or workers initiate petitions and use the trade remedy laws’ provisions to limit competition from injurious 
imports. Nevertheless, though trade remedies are, in principle, consistent with a member’s WTO obligations, 
negatively affected trading partners routinely request that formal dispute settlement panels be established to examine 
the WTO-consistency of their use. Table 1 illustrates how, by one measure – simply counting the requests for 
consultations received under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) – disputes relating to trade 
remedies made up nearly one-half of all WTO disputes initiated between 1999 and 2004. This is a clear shift in 
litigation emphasis from the period immediately following the WTO’s inception, when less than one in seven 
disputes concerned trade remedies.
1  
That such a large share of the WTO dispute settlement caseload involves challenges to antidumping, 
countervailing duties and safeguards is perhaps not surprising, given the relative transparency of these policies and 
the cross-country proliferation of antidumping use in particular. Zanardi (2004), for example, reports that countries 
imposed over 1,000 antidumping measures after over 1,600 investigations between 1995 and 2001 alone.
2  
Furthermore, WTO dispute panels have held and the Appellate Body has confirmed WTO-inconsistencies with at 
least one element of almost every trade remedy action that they have ruled on (Durling, 2003; Sykes, 2003).
3 
Finally, it is important to point out that the record of successful WTO challenges is not due to learning difficulties 
                                                           
1 Note that these numbers are rough measures as there are frequently examples of both multiple disputes covering 
the same imposed remedy (e.g., the 2002 U.S. safeguard over steel led to nine separate disputes being initiated) and 
multiple trade remedies being challenged in a single dispute (e.g., United States — Laws, Regulations and 
Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), DS294, which challenged 21 separate U.S. trade 
remedies).  
 
2 To the extent that WTO members desire reform of the agreements covering trade remedies, an increased frequency 
of initiated disputes may be a negotiating tactic to increase visibility and the likelihood that they receive a place on 
the negotiating agenda during the ongoing round.  
 
3 Durling (2003, p. 131) notes that for disputes over antidumping measures, in 12 of the 13 cases that reached the 
panel stage between 1995 and 2002, panels found at least some WTO inconsistency. For cases in which a United 
States antidumping measure was at issue, the record is 6 out of 7 WTO disputes. Sykes (2003) discusses WTO 
rulings on challenged safeguard actions, and Cunningham and Crib (2003) discuss WTO rulings on U.S. 
countervailing duty cases. 
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that might face relatively inexperienced “new users” of trade remedy laws. To the contrary, the successful legal 
challenges to trade remedies have largely targeted developed countries with a history of trade remedy use, i.e., 
countries with the most experienced bureaucratic agencies that administer trade remedy investigations with 
resources and access to potentially sophisticated legal (and economic) analysis. The implication is that the measures 
being successfully challenged are imposed by countries whose trade remedy laws serve as models that countries new 
to establishing their own statutes and investigative procedures are quick to emulate.   
From this perspective, i.e., given the relatively transparent process through which a trade remedy action is 
implemented, the increasing frequency with which trade remedies are applied worldwide, and the fact that virtually 
all challenged measures that proceed to a Panel and/or Appellate Body decision are found to have some 
inconsistency with WTO standards, the more poignant research question is, why have so few of these applied trade 
remedies actually been challenged at the WTO?
4 What factors influence an adversely affected country’s decision of 
whether to formally challenge an imposed trade remedy through formal dispute initiation at the DSU? 
This paper is a first attempt to empirically investigate determinants of WTO members’ decisions of whether 
to challenge an imposed trade remedy through a formal WTO dispute. The fact that not all imposed trade remedies 
are challenged at the WTO suggests that governments undertake a calculus and only pursue actions in which the 
expected benefit to a WTO dispute outweighs the expected cost. The expected benefit would be jointly determined 
by the size of restored import market access should the importing country remove the remedy,
5 combined with the 
probability of restoration of market access. The probability of restored market access is determined by the likelihood 
that the respondent would comply with Panel and/or Appellate Body decisions upholding a successful challenge, 
                                                           
4 This has similarities to a question raised by Blonigen and Prusa (2003) in their survey of the economics research 
literature of antidumping. They observe that given the ease of apparent access to antidumping protection and 
“[d]espite the statistics … detailing the substantial and growing use of AD [antidumping] laws, one question is why 
there aren’t more AD filings.” On the other hand, some commentators have argued that too many U.S. remedies 
have been challenged at the WTO, and that WTO rulings on U.S.-imposed remedies (and the concern for the 
Appellate Body’s “judicial activism”) in particular may have long-term implications for U.S.-willingness to 
participate in the system. For commentary along these lines, see Tarullo (2003) or Greenwald (2003). 
 
5 For a basic economic discussion of the WTO as a forum for countries to exchange market access concessions 
based on the principle of reciprocity, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002, chapter 4). Unlike many other disputed policies 
that may be applied on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis, the expected benefit to a complainant has minimal trade-
associated “externalities,” given that the vast majority of trade remedies are applied on a discriminatory (i.e.,   
country-specific) basis, which should thus serve to reduce the free-rider problem affecting the optimal amount of 
litigation. For a discussion of some of the economic implications of the WTO’s nondiscriminatory MFN principle, 
see Bagwell and Staiger (2002, chapter 5). In dispute settlement cases over trade remedies there may be procedural 
externalities, however, if the legal decisions made in a case establish precedent that discourages future trade 
remedies (as they would also be inconsistent with GATT/WTO standards) against other countries.   3
where compliance may also be a function of a credible threat of the complainant retaliating through the DSU-
sanctioned withdrawal of concessions. On the other hand, the expected costs to pursuing a case could include both 
the resource costs associated with litigation, as well as the political-economic costs associated with challenging the 
remedy-imposing country through formal international dispute settlement. Finally, there may also be a procedural 
cost if the litigation were to establish a precedent that would also require the complainant to change the way in 
which it pursues trade remedies in its own import markets. 
We propose and empirically test whether there are political and economic motives to explain the pattern of 
challenges to trade remedies through formal WTO dispute settlement activity when compared to those remedies that 
are not challenged. As a first pass at this question, we construct a sample of all U.S. trade remedy actions against 
WTO members falling under its antidumping and countervailing duty laws between 1992 and 2003.
6  We argue that 
there are a number of reasons that motivate this as a useful initial investigation.
7  First, as we illustrate in tables 2 
and 3, there is a substantial amount of variation in trade remedy actions imposed by the United States over this time 
period – remedies target many different WTO members and were challenged by a reasonable cross-section of those 
affected countries.
8 Second, unlike the WTO membership at large, we have very detailed data on the full set of U.S. 
trade remedy actions and their WTO challenges – including data on the policies as well as detailed data on the 
products and industries affected. Third, by focusing initially on one trade remedy-imposing country (the U.S.), we 
are able to implicitly control for remedy-imposing country characteristics. Fourth, and as previously mentioned, 
                                                           
6 We will not empirically investigate U.S. safeguard actions (neither Section 201 nor “transitional” safeguard actions 
for textiles, agriculture, or China) that have also been called into question at the WTO, though this is also clearly an 
area of research interest.  One reason for not examining Section 201 cases here is that they are applied on a (quasi-) 
MFN basis, so that we would also have to address the free rider problem. Based on the approach undertaken here, 
there is also an empirical problem due to a lack of variation in the data, given that all U.S. safeguard measures 
implemented under Section 201 since 1995 have been challenged at the WTO  (though the 1996 U.S. safeguard on 
broom corn brooms brought by Colombia did make it only as far as the consultations stage). We leave for future 
research the question of WTO challenges to U.S.-imposed safeguard measures. 
 
7 To clarify, in this paper we focus only on the foreign decision of whether to challenge an imposed U.S. trade 
remedy at the GATT/WTO. There are other potential areas in the litigative process in which parties could  also 
challenge the imposition of a remedy, including during the actual U.S. investigation, after an affirmative ruling at 
the U.S. Court of International Trade, and at NAFTA panels for remedy investigations involving Canada or Mexico. 
While all of these areas of the litigative process are of research interest, we focus exclusively on potential challenges 
at the GATT/WTO here. 
 
8 In our discussion that follows below, we will use the terms “GATT/WTO” and “WTO” interchangeably. Though 
as table 2 clearly illustrates, while some of the trade remedy investigations may have taken place at the very end of 
the GATT period, the virtually all of the dispute settlement challenges in our data set have taken place during the 
WTO period under the DSU. 
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while our focus on one remedy-imposing country does obviously impose a limit on the extent to which one can 
extrapolate from our results to lessons for other remedy-imposing countries; nevertheless, the United States’ trade 
remedy laws and procedures in particular serve as a model that many other WTO members emulate as they construct 
their own provisions. Thus lessons learned from the U.S. experience and interaction with WTO dispute settlement 
may arguably have implications for other international users of trade remedies as well. 
Table 4 uses the U.S. data on trade remedies to illustrate a number of comparative results that our formal 
econometric investigation formally seeks to confirm. First, and perhaps not surprisingly, a U.S. trade remedy that 
leads to the loss of a large value of imports in the U.S. market is more likely to result in a measure being challenged 
than one resulting in the loss of a small value of imports. This is consistent with the first row of table 4, which shows 
that the mean level of lost imports in WTO-challenged measures is $49.9 million, relative to $3.2 million for non-
challenged U.S. remedies. Second, we also find that the capacity for the foreign country to retaliate over U.S. 
exports should it “win” the case is also associated with a higher probability of it bringing forward a dispute in the 
first place. This is illustrated by a simple comparison made in table 4, where the mean share of U.S. exports sent to 
countries that challenge trade remedies is 16.9%, whereas the U.S. is less reliant on the average country that does 
not formally challenge a U.S. remedy at the WTO, as that country receives only 6.5% of U.S. exports. 
We also investigate and provide evidence of a second avenue through which the capacity for retaliation 
threats matters, and we find that this avenue could be serving as a substitute to formal WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings. The data suggests a strong negative relationship between a WTO dispute filing and the foreign 
industry’s capacity to directly retaliate against the U.S. industry through a reciprocal antidumping investigation and 
measure of its own. Consider the destination of the production of the U.S. industry that receives the protection from 
the initial U.S. trade remedy. Table 4 illustrates that the share of the value of that production that is exported to the 
affected foreign country is higher (0.9% versus 0.7%) in the average case in which the foreign country does not file 
a WTO complaint. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that WTO dispute settlement procedures and the 
foreign country’s own antidumping law can serve as substitute policy instruments. Thus some exporting countries 
that are affected by U.S. trade remedies may be choosing “vigilante justice” and directly targeting their U.S. 
competitors with antidumping actions, in lieu of convincing their government to confront the U.S. with a formal 
WTO dispute. Finally, we also note the relationship between this phenomenon and the idea first proposed by Prusa 
(1992), that antidumping law may inadvertently serve as a device that facilitates collusion between foreign and   5
domestic firms. The nature of the collusion noted by Prusa (1992) stemmed from the empirical regularity that 
domestic firms frequently withdrew from U.S. antidumping investigations shortly after their initiation, and the 
argument was that some firms had merely initiated investigations in order to communicate economic information to 
foreign competitors without risk of prosecution under a U.S. antitrust exception called the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. Here the collusive behavior of domestic and foreign firms could be facilitated by the reciprocated use of 
antidumping laws across countries, if it is serving as a way for one country’s industry to either discipline foreign 
competitors (i) that have deviated from a collusive outcome, or (ii) into observing a collusive outcome.
9 
We also document a number of other interesting results in the data. First, countries that are less diversified 
(i.e., more reliant on the U.S. for their export market) for their remedy-affected exports are also less likely to 
challenge the U.S. trade remedy. This is also illustrated on  table 4, where, on average, 63.0% of pre-remedy exports 
are sent to non-U.S. markets in challenged cases, whereas only 45.0% of pre-remedy exports are sent to third 
markets in the average non-challenged case. This is of potential concern given that non-diversified exporters may be 
the least likely to “deflect” lost exports to third markets, perhaps because they lack the prior experience of 
overcoming any fixed cost associated with exporting to alternative markets. In a global welfare context, this could 
make the impact of a U.S. trade remedy especially burdensome. Finally, unlike the results of other related research, 
we find no evidence that, holding other things constant, our measure of a foreign country’s limited “legal capacity” 
negatively affects the decision to participate in a dispute against a potentially WTO-inconsistent policy. 
In addition to its relevance for the research literature on trade remedies and the antidumping process in the 
United States, this paper also contributes to the empirical literature on formal dispute settlement in the GATT/WTO 
system, which has largely focused on other elements of the dispute resolution process.
10 One important and 
                                                           
9 We should also note that there are a number of reasons why antidumping retaliation would be preferable to a WTO 
dispute from the perspective of the negatively affected foreign industry. First, to the extent that an antidumping law 
is simply a bureaucratic process that is largely exempt from political influences, the industry may find that direct 
antidumping retaliation provides a more certain outcome than attempts at convincing its national government to take 
up a case against the U.S. on its behalf at the WTO. Furthermore, antidumping retaliation would be more likely to 
directly benefit the foreign industry, whereas even DSU-sanctioned retaliation against the U.S. could be sought after 
and authorized as the withdrawal of concessions over a completely separate sector, thus providing no gains to the 
foreign industry negatively affected by the initial U.S. remedy. 
 
10 Bown (2004a), for example, provides an empirical investigation into determinants of the economic outcomes of 
the GATT/WTO dispute resolution process for 1973-1998. See Busch and Reinhardt (2001) for a political science 
perspective. With respect to economic investigations of the potential bias in participation in the WTO’s dispute 
settlement process, see Horn et al. (1999),  Holmes et al. (2003) and Bown (2004b). For a discussion of capacity 
constraints affecting developing country participation in the U.S. antidumping process in particular, see Bown et al. 
(2003).   6
unresolved research question, however, concerns “access” to dispute settlement activity, and whether the use of 
WTO dispute settlement may be biased against the initiation of cases by smaller, poorer, or developing countries in 
particular. The standard problem for a researcher seeking to address this question is data – we are unable to  observe 
the full set of “WTO-inconsistent” activity that WTO members undertake, and thus we cannot directly test whether 
there is a bias in which subset of this activity actually gets reported to the WTO through formal dispute settlement 
channels. Here we partially address this question by supposing that “all” U.S. trade remedy actions were WTO-
inconsistent, and under this scenario, examining whether there is a pattern to the initiation of disputes over imposed 
measures to search for evidence of any bias against dispute initiation by important country and industry 
characteristics.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe some of the basic institutional 
features of WTO-authorized trade remedy laws, as well as provide a brief discussion of their economic motivation. 
In section 3 we present the basic expected cost-benefit framework that we use to guide our empirical approach 
investigating determinants of whether a U.S. trade remedy action is challenged at the WTO, as well as a description 
of the underlying data used for the analysis. Section 4 presents our formal econometric model, including the 
selection equation approach used to address the potential concern for sample selection bias. Finally, section 5 
presents our econometric results, and section 6 concludes with a discussion of additional caveats and areas for 
further research. 
 
2  Institutional Background for Trade Remedies: Law and Economic Theory 
2.1   Economic Motivation for Trade Remedy Laws 
Economists typically decry an implemented trade remedy as import protection that generates welfare 
inefficiencies and acts as little more than a second-best policy instrument. Nevertheless, economic theorists have 
rationalized the ex ante inclusion of some form of permissible national trade remedy law into negotiated 
international trade agreements through at least two reasons. While traditionally motivated through inclusion of a 
safeguard clause allowing for the temporary suspension of certain elements of the liberal trade agreement, 
economists justify this on the grounds of what Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) refer to as either the “insurance” or   7
“safety valve” motives.
11 The insurance motive suggests that without such safeguard provisions, governments may 
be hesitant to sign trade agreements that lead to substantial liberalization. The safety valve motive suggests that 
governments may feel pressure to renege on certain negotiated liberalization commitments, and therefore safeguards 
are necessary to protect the integrity of the rest of the agreement.  
WTO members have infrequently utilized the formal GATT/WTO safeguard provisions over the 
agreements’ histories, instead appealing to the other trade remedies such as antidumping and countervailing duty 
provisions under the WTO and voluntary export restraints and other “grey-area measures” under the GATT, that 
have since been banned under the WTO.
12 While there are many procedural differences between them, we work 
from the assumption that there is substitutability between the trade remedy instruments that are used by injured 
industries and then policymakers seeking an escape from the constraint of the GATT/WTO agreement that prohibits 
them from otherwise unilaterally raising trade barriers above negotiated tariff binding levels. 
 
2.2   National Trade Remedy Laws and GATT/WTO Agreements 
Under the GATT 1947 regime, antidumping and countervailing duties were initially authorized under 
Article VI, which was somewhat expanded in the Tokyo Round to the plurilateral Antidumping and Subsidies 
Codes. Under the WTO, the provisions relating to antidumping and countervailing duties are now part of the Single 
Undertaking that applies to all WTO members under the Agreement on Antidumping  and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Safeguards for the temporary protection of imports were originally 
authorized under the GATT’s Article XIX, and in 1995 were also more completely developed under the WTO’s 
Agreement on Safeguards. 
 
                                                           
11 See also Sykes (1991) and the discussion in Bagwell and Staiger (2002, chapter 6), as well as Bagwell and Staiger 
(2004). 
 
12 For a discussion of the economic incentives generated by the WTO rules on safeguards and antidumping in 
particular, which suggests that they might be acting as substitutable policy instruments, see Bown (2002). 
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2.3   The History of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement over Trade Remedies 
The first formal GATT trade dispute over antidumping that resulted in a panel was initiated by Italy against 
Swedish antidumping duties on nylon stockings in 1954.
13 Nevertheless, until the early 1990s, countries infrequently 
challenged antidumping measures under the GATT’s formal dispute settlement provisions. The first GATT case 
against a U.S. antidumping action resulting in a panel report was not filed until 1988, under the dispute settlement 
provisions of the Tokyo Round’s Dumping Code.
14 There were a handful of disputes filed against U.S. imposition of 
countervailing duties in the 1980s under the Subsidies Code and the GATT’s Article XXIII, including the first high-
profile disputes over U.S. countervailing duties on imports of Canadian softwood lumber. Nevertheless, the trend of 
infrequent formal challenges to trade remedies continued through the end of the GATT period in the early 1990s. 
With the establishment of the WTO’s Single Undertaking in 1995 and the full integration of the 
Agreements on Antidumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and Safeguards, as well as the establishment 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, trade remedies have been a frequent and increasing target of dispute 
settlement activity. Once again, table 3 illustrates the U.S. trade remedy actions undertaken between 1992 and 2003 
that were challenged with an initiated trade dispute at the GATT/WTO. 
 
2.4   The Importance of WTO Dispute Settlement over Trade Remedies 
The decisions made by the WTO Panels and  the Appellate Body have sparked a substantial literature by 
legal and economic scholars (Sykes, 2003; Irwin, 2003). One particular area of concern is the consistency between 
national and WTO standards of review in trade remedy investigations, as well as the concern for whether WTO legal 
decisions are not just striking down imposed remedies, but also providing guidance for what would be an 
appropriate methodology for the imposition of national trade remedies that would pass WTO standards. Even though 
the ultimate imposition of a remedy leads to the distortion of trade, the misallocation of resources, and national 
welfare losses; nevertheless, scholars have argued that it may be important to define the characteristics of a WTO-
consistent trade remedy that would stand up to a dispute settlement challenge if such remedies are indeed an 
                                                           
13 Swedish Antidumping Duties (L/328 – 3S/81) Report adopted on 26 February 1955. 
 
14 United States - Imposition Of Anti-Dumping Duties On Imports Of Seamless Stainless Steel Hollow Products 
From Sweden  - Report of the Panel (ADP/47). 
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important feature helping to sustain the overall liberal trade bargain struck between countries in the GATT/WTO 
system (see again Bagwell and Staiger, 2002 and 2004; Sykes, 1991; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
 
3   Economic Theory: When to Challenge a U.S. Trade Remedy at the WTO? 
3.1   The Sample of Challengeable U.S. Trade Remedies 
  Our question of interest is the determinants of a WTO member’s decision of whether to formally challenge 
a U.S. trade remedy that was imposed in year t, where the year of the remedy falls in the 1992-2003 period. All of 
the data on U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty actions have been compiled from the publicly available U.S. 
government publication, the Federal Register. This publication documents the country of the firms under 
investigation, the 10-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) product codes of the products under investigation, the 
dates of the phases of the investigation, the outcomes of various phases of the investigation, and the level of applied 
duties in affirmative cases. We include all trade remedy actions that either ended in the U.S. application of duties or 
through a suspension agreement, implicitly assuming that all such remedies were “challengeable” at the WTO.
15 
Our hypothesis is that a country that is targeted by a U.S. trade remedy will initiate a formal WTO trade 
dispute and contest the measure if the expected benefit to a dispute are greater than its expected costs. We assume 
that the expected benefit depends on the size of the gains the foreign country receives from a successfully resolved 
case as well as the probability that the case will be resolved successfully. We allow for the expected costs of dispute 
initiation to be made up of two separate elements that include both the expected litigation costs and the expected 
political-economic costs to confronting the United States in a formal dispute. As we describe in more detail below, 
our hypothesis allows for economic interests to affect decisions, but we also include proxies for some of the 
institutional biases that WTO scholars have been concerned might also influence a country’s ability to stand up for 
its market access interests.   
The primary alternative hypothesis to the one we pursue here is that imposed trade remedies are not 
formally challenged under dispute settlement proceedings because of the Agreement on Antidumping’s Article 17.6 
requirement that WTO Panels show deference to national authorities’ decision-making during antidumping 
                                                           
15 We will only be able to use cases involving manufacturing products due to our need to control for injury 
(requiring industry-level data, which is not comparably available for agricultural products.) This does not severely 
restrict the size of the sample, however. 
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investigations.
16 The failure to find evidence of our political economic determinants affecting the WTO-challenge 
decision would be consistent with the theory that the WTO membership is acting rationally and not challenging 
cases that would either have high market access gains and/or which would could be litigated at relatively low cost, 
because they anticipate that dispute settlement panels would indeed show “deference” and follow Article 17.6, thus 
placing an extraordinarily low probability on the expectation of a successful legal outcome to the case. 
  We classify a U.S.-imposed trade remedy as being challenged if we can find evidence of a formal dispute 
being initiated under the GATT or WTO. We consider all challenges to U.S.-imposed remedies, whether the 
challenge concerns the investigation of dumping, subsidies, or injury, or whether it is an investigation during an 
administrative or sunset review. Most of the data on which trade remedies were formally challenged by foreign 
countries through GATT/WTO dispute settlement proceedings are also available in publicly available data bases. 
For example, the WTO’s website has all of the data on formal disputes covering the period since 1995, as well as 
some antidumping and countervailing disputes that resulted in formal panel reports under the GATT period. A 
handful of antidumping and countervailing duty disputes that took place under the dispute settlement provisions of 
the Tokyo Round Codes were pieced together by examining unpublished GATT documents. The summary of these 
GATT/WTO challenges to U.S. trade remedies imposed over the 1992-2003 period is listed in table 2. 
In the next two sections we detail the variables and data we use to represent the expected benefits and costs 
of our empirical investigation.  
 
3.2   Expected Benefits to Initiating a Dispute 
3.2.1  Exporter market access benefits from a successful dispute 
What are the expected benefits to initiating a dispute against a U.S.-imposed trade remedy, and when would 
they be large? For the purpose of this investigation, we focus on the direct, short-term economic benefits to 
participating in the dispute, i.e. the improved terms of market access that would result if the U.S. removed the trade 
remedy in question. Thus, we expect a foreign country is more likely to initiate proceedings when it has lost a 
substantial amount of trade due to the U.S. remedy. Given that the imposition of many U.S. remedies has a   
                                                           
16 Formally, Article 17.6(i) states that when a WTO panel reviews the national authority’s antidumping investigation 
and decisions, “[i]f the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even 
though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned…” 
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prohibitive impact on imports (Staiger and Wolak 1994; Prusa 2001; Bown 2004c), we use as our proxy for lost 
imports the log of the value of 10-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) imports of the targeted product in year t-
1, i.e. the year before the trade remedy was imposed.  The 10-digit HTS import data for the United States comes 
from Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2002) and updates from the ITC’s DataWeb database.  
Second, the removal of the U.S.-imposed trade remedy may not be particularly important to some exporting 
countries that have substantial access to alternative export markets and can thus “deflect” trade that is eliminated 
from the U.S. to other markets.
17 Put differently, the removal of the U.S.-imposed remedy may be more beneficial to 
a less-diversified exporter than to a more-diversified exporter. To address the possibility that this affects the WTO 
litigation decision, we include as an additional explanatory variable the share of the exporter’s product-level exports 
to the non-U.S. markets in t-1 relative to its total product-level world exports of the goods targeted by the U.S. 
remedy.
18 We expect this variable to be negatively related to the decision of whether to initiate a dispute – a country 
that is highly diversified (i.e., with a large share of remedy-affected exports already being exported to third markets), 
should be less likely to challenge a U.S.-imposed remedy at the WTO, because it more easily shift those lost U.S. 
exports to such third markets. 
Third, we also include the level of the U.S.-imposed trade remedy in the case, which we define as the trade 
weighted-average final duty reported in the Federal Register. We are admittedly agnostic as to how this variable 
would affect the likelihood of WTO dispute initiation. While an extremely high duty may also be more likely to 
indicate an egregious WTO violation (affecting the likelihood of legal success in the dispute, to be discussed in more 
detail below), there may be a substantial range through which even lowering that duty would still leave it as 
prohibitive, resulting in a zero market access benefit to the affected exporter for initiating a WTO-challenge. On the 
other hand, while a lower imposed duty may be less likely to be WTO-inconsistent, a marginal reduction could have 
a substantially positive market access impact.  
                                                           
17 For evidence on exporting countries ability to “deflect” U.S. trade remedy-affected exports to third markets, see 
Bown and Crowley (2004). 
 
18 Since we are comparing the foreign exports to the non-U.S. markets relative to foreign exports to the world (at the 
product level), we can no longer use the 10-digit HTS import data as our level of aggregation. Thus, for this variable 
we use the 6-digit, product level Harmonized System (HS) data derived from the UN’s COMTRADE database, as 
this is the most disaggregated trade data that is readily comparable across countries.  Nevertheless, this data is only 
consistently available for 15 of the world’s 30 largest importing countries for the 1992-2003 period required for our 
sample; therefore, in constructing the ratio, the foreign country’s exports to the “rest of the world” are proxied for by 
the imports of the following 14 other countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, China, Germany, Denmark, 
Japan, Mexico, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey and Taiwan.   12
3.2.2  The likelihood of success in a dispute 
Another element relating to the size of the expected benefits are factors affecting the probability of a 
successful economic resolution to a potential WTO dispute. Due to the self-enforcing nature of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, exporting countries can only enforce their rights through actual or implicit threats of retaliation 
against offending trading partners.
19 Therefore, we hypothesize that a U.S. remedy is more likely to be challenged if 
the affected foreign country is bilaterally powerful (with respect to the U.S.) because this positively affects the 
probability of a successful economic outcome. Conditional on a “guilty” Panel  and/or Appellate Body ruling, the 
U.S. may be more likely to bring its WTO-inconsistent policy into conformity with its obligations if there is a 
credible retaliatory cost for failing to do so. We therefore measure the capacity for the foreign country to credibly 
threaten a tariff retaliation by using the share of U.S. total exports sent to the exporting country. To construct this 
measure, we use the U.S. bilateral export data provided in Feenstra et al. (2002). 
Finally, in an additional specification that serves as a robustness check, we utilize additional explanatory 
variables designed to capture whether the affected country can contribute economic evidence of the U.S. failure to 
show injury to the domestic U.S. industry in the initial trade remedy investigation. The failure to find injury would 
be evidence to support the claim that U.S.-imposed remedy was WTO-inconsistent which, ceteris paribus, would 
result in a higher probability of winning the case by having a DSU panel find in the complainants’ favor.
20 We will 
discuss details of variables used for these measures in section 4.2 below.
  
 
3.3  Expected Costs to Initiating a Dispute Against the U.S. 
In this section we consider the basic litigation costs to filing a formal complaint against a U.S. trade 
remedy.
21 When would the expected resource costs to an exporting country of formally initiating a dispute against 
                                                           
19 Using a sample of GATT/WTO disputes initiated and completed over the 1973-1998 period, Bown (2004a) has 
shown that the more powerful is the complainant exporter with respect to its capacity to engage in tariff retaliation 
against the respondent, the greater are the trade liberalization gains that the respondent yields to the complainant at 
the conclusion of the dispute. 
 
20 As Sykes (2003) and Irwin (2003) point out in related safeguard cases which also have an injury requirement, 
merely showing evidence of injury is not sufficient, the WTO Appellate Body in particular has been concerned with 
evidence attributing injury to imports. 
 
21 In our robustness checks described in section 5.2.4 below, we also investigate measures of political economic 
costs that may affect the litigation decision as well. 
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the U.S. be high? The litigation costs of merely initiating a case as a complainant are not large, and that is the only 
indicator necessary for our analysis of whether a U.S. trade remedy is challenged at the WTO. Nevertheless, we do 
proxy for the foreign country’s capacity to incur significant legal costs by using measures of its real GDP per capita, 
with data derived from World Bank (2004). We feel that this is a reasonable measure and is likely better than one 
designed to capture the stock of lawyers in the foreign country, given that legal expertise is an internationally traded 
service. Nevertheless, we also proxy for a country’s legal capacity by using data on the number of delegates the 
WTO member had sent to the Secretariat in Geneva. The larger are each of these variables, the greater the country’s 
capacity to absorb legal costs and the more likely it will initiate a dispute, ceteris paribus. 
 
3.4  Access to Alternative Retaliatory Instruments 
Our last explanatory variable included in this stage of the estimation is designed to capture the concern that 
a country may choose not to use the formal dispute settlement process at the WTO to challenge a U.S.-imposed trade 
remedy because it has access to an alternative (and perhaps preferable) retaliatory instrument, i.e., because it is able 
to take matters into its own hands and hit the protected U.S. industry with a trade remedy of its own. Therefore, we 
include another measure which is the share of the U.S. industry’s value of domestic production that is exported to 
the remedy-affected country, where the industry is the 6-digit NAICS industry that is receiving the U.S. trade 
remedy protection.
22  The higher is the share of the value of U.S. industry production exported to the foreign 
country, the less likely is the foreign country to initiate a formal WTO dispute against the U.S. because it can 
discipline the U.S. industry directly through its own appeal to a trade remedy investigation. The industry level 
production data is the value of shipments data taken from the NBER Manufacturing Industry Productivity Database 
for the 1991-1996 period, while for 1997-2002, the data was taken from individual, industry level reports in the U.S. 
Census Bureaus’ publication, 2002 Economic Census, Manufacturing Industry Series.
23 
                                                           
22 The U.S. 6-digit NAICS export data is also taken from Feenstra et. al (2002). Blonigen and Bown (2003) have 
found evidence that the capacity for foreign antidumping retaliation threats affects an earlier stage of the 
antidumping process, i.e., the question of which foreign countries are to be named in an antidumping investigation. 
Their results suggest that, ceteris paribus, a U.S. industry is less likely to name a foreign country on whom its 
market it is particularly reliant for its own exports. 
 
23 We have also interacted this variable with an indicator for whether the WTO member has an antidumping law, but 
this makes little difference as virtually all WTO members in the sample of countries hit with a U.S. remedy had an 
antidumping law in place. 
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The summary statistics for each of these variables used in the estimation are provided in the rows of the 
lower half of table 5. 
 
4  Econometric Approach  
4.1   Econometric Model 
Our ultimate question of interest is why foreign governments choose to challenge some U.S. trade remedies 
while not challenging other U.S. measures. To address this question, our sample of data consists of the set of U.S. 
trade remedy actions imposed after antidumping and countervailing duty investigations initiated between 1992 and 
2003. We only focus on those applied against GATT Contracting Parties or WTO members, as formal participation 
in the GATT/WTO system is an obvious requirement for the foreign country’s use of GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement procedures. Our empirical investigation will thus examine determinants of a dichotomous dependent 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if a U.S. trade remedy was challenged by a WTO trade dispute and 0 if it was 
not. In the absence of any additional econometric concerns, we would simply estimate the probability that a U.S. 
trade remedy was challenged by assuming that the decision was a function of a number of covariates with a 
normally distributed error term, and we would thus employ the standard probit model.  
However, one concern with examining in isolation the foreign country’s decision of whether or not to file a 
GATT/WTO dispute over a U.S.-imposed trade remedy is selection bias.
24 In our case, selection bias results from 
the incidental data truncation problem associated with the fact that we only observe formal trade disputes over U.S. 
trade remedy investigations that would ultimately result in the trade remedy being applied. For example, one of our 
key testable hypothesis is that a foreign country is more likely to file a WTO dispute against the U.S. if it has a 
sufficient retaliation capacity, and thus we presume that this may have a direct effect on our underlying dependent 
variable of interest. However, given the evidence provided by Blonigen and Bown (2003), we would also expect that 
the same retaliation capacity may also affect the likelihood that the U.S. imposes a trade remedy against that 
particular foreign country in the first place, and thus it also has an indirect affect on the probability that this country 
                                                           
24 For a further discussion of the selection bias problem in econometrics, see Greene (2000, pp. 926-950). 
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is in our sample of countries facing a U.S. trade remedy. Thus failing to allow for the indirect effect of this variable 
could lead to biased estimates of the direct effect.
25 
To address the concern of selection bias resulting from the idea that the set of U.S. trade remedies over 
which a foreign country has faced a tariff is not random, we use a Heckman (1979) style correction procedure and 
introduce a selection equation accounting for the U.S. government’s decision of whether or not to impose a trade 
remedy on a GATT/WTO member country after an industry-initiated investigation. For our purposes, the standard 
Heckman procedure needs to be modified to address the fact that both the selection equation (U.S. protects or 
doesn’t protect an industry petitioning under the trade remedy laws) and the regression equation of interest (foreign 
country challenges or doesn’t challenge the U.S. remedy with a formal WTO dispute) have dichotomous (as 
opposed to continuous) dependent variables. Therefore, we use the Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) probit 
application of the Heckman (1979) selection bias correction procedure.  
 
4.2   Additional Variables and Data for the Selection Equation 
Finally, in order to estimate the selection equation, we require additional explanatory variables that are not 
necessarily of interest to our question of the determinants of the foreign country’s decision of whether it will 
challenge any imposed measures with formal dispute settlement proceedings. Nevertheless, we have collected 
industry and country-level data on the standard political and economic variables that others (e.g., Hansen and Prusa, 
1996; 1997) in the literature have shown to be determinants of the U.S. authority’s decision-making process. These 
include variables on the change in industry employment, level of industry employment, the import penetration ratio, 
the growth rate of investigated imports in the period prior to the investigation, the concentration ratio of the 
domestic industry, the change in the industry’s capacity utilization rate, as well as retaliation capacity (Blonigen and 
Bown, 2003).
26 We expect there to be a negative relationship between the change in industry employment and the 
                                                           
25 This may also be the case if evidence of injury to the domestic industry makes it more likely that a petitioning 
industry will receive trade remedy protection and thus increasing the probability of being in the sample, and yet the 
evidence of injury makes it less likely that the measure will be challenged with a formal trade dispute. We will 
investigate this potential outcome and discuss this further in section 5.2.3 below. 
 
26 Capacity utilization rate for the associated 6-digit NAICS (4-digit SIC) industries are found in the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census’ Current Industrial Reports, Survey of Plant Capacity. Four-firm concentration ratios are available form 
U.S. Bureau of the Census publication, U.S. Census of Manufactures, Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing. Data 
on the industry level value of shipments and industry-level employment are taken from the NBER Manufacturing 
Industry Productivity Database for the 1991-1996 period, while for 1997-2002, the data was taken from individual,   16
change in the capacity utilization rate (standard injury determinants) with the probability that the U.S. authorizes 
trade remedy protection to a petitioning industry. On the other hand, we expect a positive relationship between the 
U.S. protection decision and explanatory variables such as the import penetration ratio, the level of industry 
employment and the four-firm concentration ratio of the industry. These last two variables are commonly used to 
proxy for the political importance of the industry, as well as the industry’s ability to overcome the free-rider problem 
to organize and successfully petition for protection.   
 
5 Estimation  Results 
In this section we discuss the results from maximum likelihood estimation of the probit model with 
selection. Even though the two equations are estimated simultaneously, for ease of exposition we split our 
discussion of the two separate stages into two separate parts. In the first section we briefly describe the results from 
the selection equation (reported in table 6a), before turning to the results of the question of interest in section 5.2 – 
determinants of the foreign country decision of whether to challenge a U.S.-imposed trade remedy at the WTO 
(reported in table 6b). The first specification (1) in each table uses the baseline sample of U.S. antidumping 
investigations and measures imposed on GATT/WTO members over the 1992-2003 period, the second specification 
(2) adds the sample of countervailing duty investigations and measures imposed, and the third specification (3) is a 
robustness check that allows for industry injury determinants to also affect the WTO-challenge decision. 
  
5.1  Selection Equation: Determinants of Which U.S. Investigations Against GATT/WTO 
Members End in Trade Remedies 
Table 6a shows the results for determinants of the selection equation decision of whether the U.S. 
investigation of a GATT/WTO member under its antidumping or countervailing duty laws results in affirmative 
findings (injury and dumping and/or subsidies) and thus a trade remedy. While most of the estimates for the 
explanatory variables have the sign that is predicted by theory, only three of the estimates are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. In the sample of investigations of products deriving from WTO members shown in column 
(1), the U.S. is more likely to impose an antidumping measure the higher the import penetration ratio (2.729) and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
industry level reports published in the U.S. Census Bureaus’ series, 2002 Economic Census, Manufacturing Industry 
Series.   17
less reliant is the U.S. on the targeted foreign country for its own exports (-0.720). In specification (2), the U.S. 
authorities are also more likely to impose a trade remedy, the larger is the recent surge in product-level imports 
under investigation (0.107). The only estimates that run counter to the theory are the variables designed to capture 
the “injury” to the domestic industry (change in employment, change in capacity utilization), though these estimates 
are not statistically different from zero.
27 Since the estimates presented in table 6a are not of particular concern to the 
ultimate question of interest regarding the question of whether to formally challenge a U.S.-imposed remedy at the 
GATT/WTO, we will not further discuss them here. 
 
5.2  Regression Equation: Determinants of Foreign Country Decisions to Formally 
Challenge a U.S. Remedy with a WTO Dispute 
Table 6b provides results from our estimation of the decision of a foreign country to challenge a U.S.-
imposed trade remedy at the WTO. 
 
5.2.1  Expected benefits and costs to dispute initiation 
Consider initially the first three rows of table 6b which describe whether the size of the market access 
benefits from the U.S. removing the imposed trade remedy are associated with the WTO member’s decision to 
formally challenge the measure with a dispute. First, the size of lost imports matters. The larger the dollar value of 
the investigated products in the U.S. import market in t-1 (the year before the trade remedy investigation), the more 
likely is the affected foreign country to challenge the measure (0.056). Since the import data is converted to logs – 
the size of the effect is not particularly easy to interpret. Nevertheless, the impact of an increase from the mean value 
of the explanatory variable of 16.857 (the log of roughly $21 million in targeted imports) to 17.857 (the log of 
roughly $57 million in targeted imports, less than a one standard deviation increase) increased the likelihood of 
dispute initiation by 5.6 percentage points. Keeping in mind that the model’s predicted probability at the means of 
the data is roughly a 10% likelihood of WTO dispute initiation, this is a sizable effect. 
                                                           
27 A potential contributing explanation for the result that the “injury” determinants are not particularly successful in 
predicting antidumping decision-making is the sample of U.S. trade remedy investigations used in the estimation 
here – i.e., we only examine investigations against GATT/WTO members. For example, this implies omitting 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations against China occurring before its WTO accession in 2001.   18
On the other hand, there is an unexpected positive relationship (0.397) between how diversified the targeted 
foreign exporters are and their likelihood of filing a GATT/WTO trade dispute. We would expect a negative 
relationship - that the smaller is the share of the non-U.S. markets in the exporter’s portfolio of export markets, the 
more likely is the exporter to spend the resources to challenge the U.S. trade remedy, because it is less readily 
equipped to deflect trade lost from the U.S. to third markets. Here the result is just the opposite (less diversified 
exporters are less likely to challenge U.S. trade remedies), which is potentially worrisome if it is indicative of a 
disproportionately large negative impact of U.S. trade remedies on such exporters. The size of the effect is also large 
– an exporter that is 1 percentage point more diversified is 0.397 percentage points more likely to initiate a dispute. 
Thus a one standard deviation increase in this variable increases the probability of dispute initiation to 24% relative 
to the 10% probability, when the model is evaluated at the means of the data. 
The third row illustrates a negative relationship (-0.508) between the size of the imposed U.S. trade remedy 
and the likelihood of the remedy being challenged. This indicates that lower duties are more likely to be challenged, 
ceteris paribus, perhaps because they are non-prohibitive – each 1 percentage point reduction in the imposed duty 
increases the likelihood of dispute initiation by 0.508 percentage points. 
Consider next the foreign country’s capacity to retaliate which is our proxy for the likelihood of the U.S. 
complying with any panel and/or Appellate Body rulings that require it to provide additional market access to the 
exporting country. The more of the U.S.’s total exports are sent to the affected country, the more likely is the 
affected country to bring a dispute against the U.S. (1.676). This is consistent with evidence from other research that 
retaliation capacity affects decisions made in the U.S. antidumping process (Blonigen and Bown, 2003), as well as 
the likelihood of the successful economic resolution to a GATT/WTO trade dispute (Bown 2004a). Here, the size of 
the estimate indicates that, relative to the average trade-remedy affected foreign country, if the U.S. is one 
percentage point more reliant on the foreign country’s markets for its total exports, the foreign country is 1.676 
percentage points more likely to initiate a WTO dispute over a U.S. remedy. 
Finally, there is little evidence from this sample of data and our proxies for “legal capacity” that any such 
limitations on legal resources negatively and systematically affect the decision to challenge an imposed U.S. trade 
remedy, once we control for other factors. If anything, the results are consistent with a negative relationship between 
the number of delegates at the WTO, GDP per capita and the question of whether to file a dispute at the WTO, 
though the impact is not statistically different from zero.    19
5.2.2   “Vigilante justice” through reciprocal antidumping instead of dispute settlement?  
One intriguing and robust result from table 6b is the evidence on the “alternative retaliation instrument” 
that is consistent with the theory that when a foreign country is faced with dealing with a U.S.-imposed trade 
remedy, there is substitutability between WTO dispute settlement and the foreign country retaliating through an 
antidumping measure of its own. That is, there is a negative relationship (-7.129) between the foreign country’s 
ability to retaliate through imposing an antidumping measure on the U.S. industry’s exports (because the U.S. 
industry is reliant on the foreign country for its own exports) and that country filing a trade dispute at the WTO. The 
direct economic implication of the estimate is that, for a 1 percentage point increase in the share of the value of U.S. 
industry production (in the 6-digit NAICS industry protected with the U.S. remedy) sent to the targeted foreign 
country, there is a 7.129 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of the foreign country responding through 
initiation of a formal WTO dispute settlement challenge. This is a substantial effect, as the mean (standard 
deviation) of this variable in the underlying data  is 0.8% (1.6%), meaning that a one standard deviation increase in 
this variable alone decreases the probability of the action being confronted with a trade dispute from roughly 10% to 
almost zero. 
One explanation for this result is that the foreign industry’s first choice after being hit with a U.S. trade 
remedy is to respond by initiating a trade remedy investigation of its own against its U.S. competitors. Then, if that 
is not possible, the industry resorts to the next best instrument, convincing its government to engage in formal, 
government-to-government litigation through a WTO trade dispute.  Our results here are obviously an indirect test, 
measuring the foreign country’s capacity to retaliate via antidumping against the petitioning U.S. industry. 
Furthermore, to the extent that senescent industries in the U.S. are frequent users of antidumping, such industries are 
not likely to be sufficiently competitive in world markets so as to have substantial exports, which thus limits the 
scope of reciprocal antidumping as a potential retaliatory instrument for foreign competitors. Nevertheless, for some 
capital intensive and cyclical U.S. industries that are globally competitive, the ability of the foreign industry to 
engage in reciprocal antidumping may be an alternative to attempts to convince its government to engage in formal 
WTO litigation. However, a direct test of this hypothesis would examine whether the foreign country actually 
retaliates with an antidumping action of its own. We do not pursue this direct test here for lack of currently available 
data on product-level, foreign antidumping actions against U.S. producers, and whether this is, indeed, a substitute 
policy instrument for filing a WTO trade dispute. We leave this important question for future research.   20
Nevertheless, this result is consistent with related research investigating the global proliferation of 
antidumping in particular. First, the United States is not only one of the largest users of trade remedies worldwide. 
Zanardi (2004) notes that between 1991 and 2002, exporting firms from the United States were the third-most 
investigated producers worldwide in foreign antidumping investigations, as well as ranking third in number of 
instances of being hit with trade remedy measures (antidumping duties and price undertakings) worldwide, behind 
only China and Korea. Finally, Prusa and Skeath (forthcoming) examine the pattern of antidumping filings across 
the world and find evidence at the bilateral level of retaliation activity that is consistent with the indirect evidence 
described here, while Feinberg and Olson (2004) use the worldwide antidumping filing data to find evidence of such 
a relationship across 2-digit industries as well. 
28 
 
5.2.3  Estimates for inclusion of countervailing duties, the injury determinants and without the 
control for selection bias 
The rest of table 6b presents a number of initial robustness checks to our analysis. First, specification (2) 
adds in the additional observations for U.S. countervailing duty measures and their WTO challenges. Even after 
including these trade remedy observations as well, the basic pattern of qualitative results is unchanged.  
In specification (3) of table 6b, we assess the importance of determinants expected to affect the injury 
decision in the U.S. trade remedy investigation (as described in table 6a) to check the robustness of our results. 
Inclusion of these variables in the second stage does not affect the qualitative pattern of results, and these variables 
are not of the expected sign and are not statistically significant. Part of the explanation for their poor performance is 
likely due to the fact that some countries are not challenging the injury investigation that took place in year t, but 
instead may be challenging a sunset or administrative review or a dumping or subsidy determination.  
Finally, in specification (4) of table 6b, we re-estimate the probit regression equation of specification (1) 
solely, i.e., without the selection equation. The sign and size of the estimates are virtually unchanged from the earlier 
specification, suggesting that selection bias is not likely affecting the estimation in this particular application.  
 
                                                           
28 Martin and Vergote (2004) develop a game theoretic model with private information between governments and 
industries in which reciprocal antidumping and the sort of “vigilante justice” described here occur on the 
equilibrium path. 
   21
5.2.4  Further robustness checks  
Table 7 provides a final set of additional robustness checks to further investigate the potential sensitivity of 
our results to alternative specifications. In particular, specification (5) uses an alternative variable in lieu of the 
measure of diversification of the foreign exporters targeted by the U.S. remedy. Instead, the variable is defined as 
the growth in (6-digit HS) exports of the targeted country to the rest of the world after the U.S. remedy has been 
imposed, i.e., its growth between t and t+1. We expect the parameter estimate on this variable to be negative – the 
more the targeted exporters increase exports of the disputed product to third markets (proxying for whether they 
actually do “deflect” trade), the less likely would be the foreign country to litigate the issue of the U.S. remedy at the 
WTO. Nevertheless, the estimate is once again positive (though it is marginally insignificant), which provides some 
confirmation of our earlier result of concern that less diversified exporters are less likely to challenge measures at 
the WTO. 
Next, in specification (6), we further investigate whether there is a link between political-economic 
relationships between countries and GATT/WTO dispute settlement filing behavior in this sample of data. In theory, 
a second potentially important expected cost to developing country exporters that may affect their decision of 
whether to challenge the U.S. at the WTO does not relate to the cost of litigation, but to the political economic costs 
of publicizing a grievance through a formal international confrontation with the U.S.  One reason why the U.S. 
might be “important” is that the country affected by the trade remedy could be particularly reliant on the United 
States for bilateral assistance. Therefore, we expect the larger is the share of total aid received by the foreign country 
that derives from the U.S., the less likely is that country to initiate a dispute against the U.S. The bilateral aid data is 
derived from OECD (2001). In order to implement this, in specification (6) we also drop the foreign exporter’s 
diversification variable, in case this is highly collinear with either the aid relationship or legal capacity variables so 
as to confound their estimated impact.  While the results do indicate a negative relationship between the foreign 
country’s reliance on the U.S. for bilateral aid and its dispute settlement decision, the size of the estimate is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the parameter estimates for the variables on legal 
capacity in specification (6) are also virtually unchanged, and the log likelihood is substantially higher than in the 
other specifications when the diversity variable is included. Thus, the lack of empirical importance of the proxies for 
the litigation costs and the political economy relationship stands in contrast to the evidence presented in the related 
research of Bown (2004b), which investigates the participation decisions of exporting countries adversely affected   22
by nondiscriminatory but WTO-inconsistent trade policies under formal DSU litigation. That investigation found 
some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that legal capacity and political-economy relationships negatively 
affect the willingness of countries to engage in the dispute resolution process. That sample of data under 
investigation was much different, however, in that it analyzed WTO disputes initiated against a variety of countries 
(not solely the U.S.) that were applied on a quasi-MFN basis, thus negatively affecting many exporting countries. 
The next two specifications (7) and (8) are crude attempts to address an econometric issue of the non-
independence of some of the observations in the estimation, given the pooling of the trade remedy data over time.
29 
The concern that we address in specification (7) is that the disputes involving an EU member country as a 
complainant are somehow driving the results. This could be the case given that there are a number of instances in 
which multiple EU-member countries are involved in related trade remedy investigations over the same product, 
which may make it more likely for those related cases to be jointly challenged at the WTO.  For example, common 
elements (WTO-inconsistencies) across cases against different EU members could make it cost effective to spread 
the litigation burden across the member states. Nevertheless, when we include an indicator for the affected foreign 
country being an EU-member, the qualitative pattern of results are virtually unchanged, and the EU indicator itself is 
negative, though it is not statistically significant.
30 
Next, in specification (8) we attempt another approach, which is to include an indicator for the instances in 
which an imposed trade remedy is one of multiple remedies that the U.S. imposed against the same set of products 
from any set of different countries. In this specification, there is evidence that such a remedy is more likely to be 
challenged at the WTO. This could be indicative of the foreign country seeking to increase market access while its 
primary competitors would still be constrained by other U.S.-imposed remedies. If it were successful, the country 
would essentially receive preferential access to the U.S. market. Nevertheless, we also note that inclusion of this 
variable does not substantively affect the qualitative pattern of results regarding the other variables of interest to the 
estimation. 
 
                                                           
29 In future research, as more data becomes available, it would also be useful to estimate a model with country fixed 
effects and which also investigates dynamic questions such as when (e.g., how long after imposition) trade remedies 
get challenged, etc. 
 
30 On the other hand, to the extent that a U.S. trade remedy investigation leads to differential duties imposed on 
firms from different EU member states (implicitly providing firms from some EU states preferential access to the 
U.S. market relative to other EU competitors, this could make it more difficult for the EU to act jointly.   23
6 Conclusion 
Regardless of whether or not the WTO’s dispute settlement process and institutional framework was 
designed to handle substantial litigation over nationally-imposed trade remedies, it currently finds disputes over 
trade remedies as a central topic of concern. Without substantial institutional reform or changes in government 
attitudes, one implication of the current global trend in administered use of contingent trade policy protection is that 
how the DSU resolves conflicts over antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguards will be an important factor 
in determining at least the perception of the WTO’s broader record of success in the multilateral trading system. A 
large and increasing share of the recent dispute settlement caseload involves challenges to nationally imposed trade 
remedies over imports, and in particular the United States’ imposition of trade remedies.  
We have provided evidence that some of the standard economic determinants affect the litigation decision 
to file a dispute against U.S.-imposed remedies: the size of imports lost to the trade remedy, the foreign country’s 
capacity to retaliate, and the size of the trade remedy that was imposed. Nevertheless, we document two additional 
results in particular that are a source of potential concern. First, the evidence implies that an adversely affected 
foreign industry may resort to a reciprocal (and retaliatory) antidumping measure against the protected U.S. industry 
if it has the capacity to do so,  in lieu of working to convince its government to file a dispute at the WTO on its 
behalf that would seek the removal of the U.S. trade remedy measure. Second, there is also evidence that less 
diversified foreign exporters are less likely to challenge U.S. trade remedies, which is a concern if these exporters 
are systematically less likely to be able to  “deflect” their lost exports to third markets when a trade remedy shuts 
them out of the U.S.  
We do note that there are a number of caveats to our approach, as well as a number of unanswered 
questions that could be an area of future research. First, our analysis focuses on U.S. trade remedies only. While this 
is a logical place to commence an empirical investigation into the questions raised here, it would be useful to know 
the usefulness of the lessons learned from the experience of challenging U.S. remedies for other remedy-imposing 
countries. Second, our approach also does not allow us to investigate a second important question: Why does the 
United States challenge so few of the foreign-imposed trade remedies targeting U.S. exporters, especially given the 
evidence that its exporters are the third most targeted set of producers in worldwide antidumping? Third, while we 
have sought to carefully characterize important elements of the data, our econometric results are based on a 
relatively small number of pooled observations, whose lack of independence may generate additional statistical   24
concerns. Nevertheless, this approach is merely a starting point, and our results do illustrate some interesting 
patterns in the underlying data which should be the focus of additional future research.   25
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Table 1.  WTO Trade Disputes, 1995-2004 
 
Respondent Trade Policy under Dispute  Disputes Initiated 
Between 1995 and 1998 
Disputes Initiated 
Between 1999 and 2004
† 
    
Antidumping law, practice or measure*  13  41 
Countervailing duty law, practice or measure  4  10 
Other trade remedy law, practice or measure 
(e.g., safeguards)  4 27 
Total trade remedy disputes  21  78 
    
    
Other non-trade remedy disputes  133  89 
    
    
Total disputes (321)  154  167 
    
 
Note:  
† disputes initiated through 15 November 2004. *For a dispute challenging more than one type of trade remedy  
(e.g., both an imposed antidumping measure and a countervailing duty), we avoid double-counting by entering 
it as challenging one type of trade remedy only (typically, an antidumping measure).  
   28
Table 2. GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings against United States Antidumping, 
Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Trade Remedy Actions,* 1992-2003 
 
U.S. Antidumping Actions (30 total)  U.S. Countervailing Duty Actions (26 total) 
Product (USITC Case No.)  GATT/WTO 
Dispute  Product (USITC Case No.)  GATT/WTO Dispute 
      
DRAMS (731-TA-556)  DS099 (Korea)  Lead and Bismuth Steel (701-TA-315)  MTN-22 (France) 
Steel Plate (731-TA-578)  DS262 (Germany)  Lead and Bismuth Steel (701-TA-316)  MTN-22 (Germany) 
Steel Sheet (731-TA-615)  DS262 (France)  Lead and Bismuth Steel (701-TA-317)  MTN-22, DS138 (UK) 
Steel Sheet (731-TA-617)  DS244 (Japan)  Carbon Steel Plate (701-TA-320)  DS218 (Brazil) 
Seamless Pipe (731-TA-710)  DS225 (Italy)  Carbon Steel Plate (701-TA-321)  DS212, DS262 (France) 
OCTG (731-TA-711)  DS268 (Argentina)  Carbon Steel Flat Products (701-TA-322)  DS212, DS262 (Germany) 
OCTG (731-TA-716)  DS282 (Mexico)  Carbon Steel Flat Products (701-TA-325)  DS280 (Mexico) 
Pasta (731-TA-734)  DS294 (Italy)  Carbon Steel Flat Products (701-TA-326)  DS212 (Spain) 
Tomatoes (731-TA-747)  DS049 (Mexico)  Carbon Steel Flat Products (701-TA-327)  DS212 (Sweden) 
Steel Wire Rod (731-TA-770)  DS294 (Italy)  Carbon Steel Flat Products (701-TA-328)  DS212 (UK) 
Steel Wire Rod (731-TA-773)  DS294 (Spain)  Hot Rolled Steel (701-TA-330)  DS218 (Brazil) 
Steel Wire Rod (731-TA-774)  DS294 (Sweden)  Corrosion-Resistant Steel (701-TA-349)  DS213 (Germany) 
Steel Plate (731-TA-788)  DS294 (Belgium) Grain-Oriented  Electric  Steel (701-TA-355)  DS212 (Italy) 
Steel Plate (731-TA-791)  DS179 (Korea)  Certain Pasta (701-TA-365)  DS212 (Italy) 
Steel Sheet and Strip (731-TA-797)  DS294 (France)  Fresh Atlantic Salmon (701-TA-372) DS097  (Chile) 
Steel Sheet and Strip (731-TA-798)  DS294 (Germany)  Steel Wire Rod (701-TA-373)  DS212 (Italy) 
Steel Sheet and Strip (731-TA-799)  DS294 (Italy)  Steel Plate (701-TA-377)  DS212 (Italy) 
Steel Sheet and Strip (731-TA-801)  DS179 (Korea)  Steel Sheet and Strip (701-TA-380) DS212  (France) 
Steel Sheet and Strip (731-TA-804)  DS294 (UK)  Steel Sheet and Strip (701-TA-381)  DS212 (Italy) 
Hot Rolled Steel (731-TA-807)  DS184 (Japan)  Live Cattle (701-TA-386)  DS167 (Canada) 
Carbon Steel Plate (731-TA-816)  DS294 (France)  Carbon Steel Plate (701-TA-387)  DS212 (France) 
Carbon Steel Plate (731-TA-817)  DS206 (India)  Carbon Steel Plate (701-TA-388)  DS206 (India) 
Carbon Steel Plate (731-TA-819)  DS294 (Italy)  Carbon Steel Plate (701-TA-390)  DS212 (Italy) 
Hot Rolled Steel (731-TA-903)  DS294 
(Netherlands) 
Softwood Lumber (701-TA-414)  DS236, DS257, DS277,  
DS311 (Canada) 
Stainless Steel Bar (731-TA-913)  DS294 (France)  Wheat (701-TA-430)  DS310 (Canada) 
Stainless Steel Bar (731-TA-914)  DS294 (Germany)  DRAMS (701-TA-431)  DS296 (Korea) 
Stainless Steel Bar (731-TA-915)  DS294 (Italy)     
Stainless Steel Bar (731-TA-918)  DS294 (UK)     
Softwood Lumber (731-TA-928)  DS247, DS264,  
DS277 (Canada) 
   
Wheat (731-TA-1019)  DS310 (Canada)     
U.S. Safeguard Actions (6 total)     
Product (USITC Case No.)  GATT/WTO Dispute 
   
Broom Corn Brooms (TA-201-65)  DS078 (Colombia) 
Wheat Gluten (TA-201-67)  DS166 (EU) 
Lamb Meat (TA-201-68)  DS177 (Australia), DS178 (New Zealand) 
Steel Wire Rod (TA-201-69)  DS214 (EU) 
Circular Welded Pipe (TA-201-70)  DS202 (Korea), DS214 (EU) 
Certain Steel Products (TA-201-73)  DS248 (EU), DS249 (Japan), DS251 (Korea), DS252 (China), DS253 (Switzerland), DS254 
(Norway), DS258 (New Zealand), DS259 (Brazil), DS274 (Taiwan) 
   
Note: *not including U.S. use of special safeguard actions on apparel, textiles and clothing, China, or agriculture.   29
Table 3.  U.S. Trade Remedy Investigations, Actions, and GATT/WTO Challenges, by Member,* 
1992-2003 
 
  Antidumping   Countervailing  Duties 








              
Japan 42  24  2    0  0  0 
Korea  35  17  3  10  6  1 
China 24  15  0    0  0  0 
India  22  10  1  10  5  1 
Mexico 22  9  2    4  1  1 
Germany 22  8  3    9  5  3 
Canada  21  5  1  11  3  2 
Brazil  20  10  0  10  4  1 
Italy  18  10  6  12  9  6 
France 16  8  4    9  5  3 
South Africa  16  6  0    2  2  0 
Venezuela 14  4  0    4  0  0 
United Kingdom  13  4  2    4  3  2 
Indonesia 12  6  0    4  2  0 
Thailand 12  5  0    2  1  0 
Spain 11  4  1    2  1  1 
Argentina 8  4  1    3  2  0 
Belgium 8  2  1    4  2  0 
Netherlands 7  4  1    1  1  0 
Malaysia 7  2  0    0  0  0 
Romania 6  3  0    0  0  0 
Turkey 6  2  0    2  1  0 
Australia 6  1  0    0  0  0 
Austria 5  0  0    3  0  0 
Chile 4  3  0    2  0  0 
Portugal 4  1  0    0  0  0 
Israel 4  0  0    2  0  0 
Sweden 3  2  1    2  1  1 
Trinidad and Tobago  3  1  0    2  0  0 
Costa Rica  3  0  0    0  0  0 
Poland 2  2  0    0  0  0 
Hungary 2  1  0    1  1  0 
Czech Republic  2  1  0    0  0  0 
New Zealand  2  0  0    3  0  0 
Colombia 2  0  0    0  0  0 
Egypt 2  0  0    0  0  0 
Finland 1  1  0    0  0  0 
Latvia 1  1  0    0  0  0 
Moldova 1  1  0    0  0  0 
Philippines 1  1  0    0  0  0 
Denmark 1  0  0    1  0  0 
Greece 1  0  0    0  0  0 
Hong Kong  1  0  0    0  0  0 
Ireland 1  0  0    0  0  0 
Lithuania 1  0  0    0  0  0 
Singapore 1  0  0    0  0  0 
Slovak Republic  1  0  0    0  0  0 
Total  417 178 29    119 55 22 
Note: *since the country’s date (year) of GATT/WTO membership. The 51 WTO challenges in this data set are less than the 56 
antidumping and countervailing duty challenges listed in table 2 because 5 WTO challenges listed in table 2 were to 
investigations that did not result in the imposition of remedies.   30
 
Table 4.  Characteristics of U.S. Trade Remedies against GATT/WTO Members 










Not Challenged with a 
GATT/WTO Dispute 
 
    
Value* of Lost Exports  
(mean difference between targeted exports in t+1 versus t-1)  -$49.9 million  -$3.2 million 
Foreign Retaliation Capacity through GATT/WTO  
(mean share of total U.S. exports to the world sent to targeted 
country) 
16.9% 6.5% 
Level of U.S.-Imposed Trade Remedy 
(mean duty)  14.7 %  45.1 % 
Foreign Retaliation Capacity through Reciprocal Antidumping  
(mean share of remedy-protected U.S. industry-level production that 
is exported to targeted country) 
0.7% 0.9% 
Diversity of Foreign Exports of Targeted Product  
(mean share of foreign total exports of remedy-targeted products 
sent to rest of the world)  
63.0% 45.0% 
    
 
Note: Time t is the year of the initiation of the trade remedy investigation. *Constant (2000) dollars.   31


















Selection Equation  
 
    
Dependent Variable 
 
Indicator equal to 1 if the GATT/WTO member under 
investigation faced an affirmative U.S. trade remedy 
ruling 
 
0.399 0.490  0  1 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Import penetration ratio in t-1 [+]  0.019  0.038  0  0.361 
Percent change in product-level imports between t-2 and t-1 [+]  0.271  0.686  -1.998  1.998 
Level
† of industry employment in t-1 [+]  1.000  0.696  0.027  5.009 
Percent change in industry employment between t-2 and t-1 [-]  -0.026  0.054 -0.409  0.265 
Percent change in capacity utilization rate between t-2 and 
t-1  [-] -0.016  0.106  -0.346  0.223 
Concentration ratio
† in t-1 [+]  0.351  0.125  0.05  0.807 
Share of U.S. total exports sent to the foreign country in t-1 [-]  0.092  0.094  0.000  0.256 
Indicator that the investigation involved the U.S. steel 
industry  [+] 0.580  0.494 0  1 
          
Regression Equation  
 
    
Dependent Variable 
 
Indicator equal to 1 if U.S. trade remedy faced a 
GATT/WTO trade dispute    0.174  0.381  0  1 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Log of value of targeted product imports in t-1  [+]  16.857  1.747  9.431  23.141 
Share of foreign total exports of remedy-targeted products 
sent to rest of the world in t-1  [-] 0.496  0.254  0.005  0.967 
Level
† of U.S.-imposed trade remedy  [??]  0.456  0.521  0  3.290 
Share of value U.S. total exports sent to the foreign country 
in t-1  [+] 0.080  0.084 0  0.240 
Share of value of U.S. industry level production that is 
exported to the foreign country in t-1  [-] 0.008  0.016  0  0.095 
Delegates at the WTO Secretariat [+]  12.962  6.209  0  23 
Log of level of per capita GDP of foreign country  [-]  8.801  1.497  5.833  10.715 
        
 
Notes: Time t is the year of the initiation of the trade remedy investigation. 
† indicates the underlying variable was scaled by 100.   32
Table 6a. Estimated Marginal Effects of the U.S. Decision of Whether to  
Impose a Trade Remedy against an Investigated GATT/WTO Member, 1992-2003  
(First Stage of Probit Model with Selection) 
 
 
   
Probit Selection Equation:   
 
Dependent variable = 1  





(AD cases only) 
(1) 
AD and CVD 
cases  
 (2) 
Include injury  
in second stage 
(3) 
































Percent change in capacity utilization rate between t-































Observations in probit selection equation  331 413  331 
Log-likelihood  -241.25 -303.78  -240.24 
 
Notes: In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clustering on related AD/CVD cases, with 
a, b, and 
c 
denoting variables statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Time t is the year of the initiation of the 
trade remedy investigation. Each stage also estimated with a constant term whose estimates are suppressed. 
   33
Table 6b. Estimated Marginal Effects of an Affected Exporting Countries’ Decision to File a 
GATT/WTO Trade Dispute Against a U.S.-Imposed Trade Remedy, 1992-2003  
(Second Stage of Probit Model with Selection) 
 
   
Probit Regression Equation:   
  
Dependent variable = 1  





(AD cases only) 
(1) 









Size of Market Access Benefits       












Share of foreign total exports of remedy-targeted 






















 c  
(0.299) 
Probability of Realizing Benefits      
Share of value U.S. total exports sent to the foreign 













Percent change in product-level imports between  
t-2 and t-1 
-- --  -0.028  
(0.077) 
-- 
Percent change in capacity utilization rate between 
t-2 and t-1 
-- --  -0.477  
(0.288) 
-- 
Alternative Retaliation Instrument       
Share of value of U.S. industry level production 













Capacity to Absorb Litigation Costs       
















       
Observations in probit regression equation  132 164  132 132 
Log-likelihood  -241.25 -303.78  -240.24 -28.97 
 
Notes: In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors corrected for clustering on related AD/CVD cases, with 
a, b, and 
c denoting 
variables statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Time t is the year of the initiation of the trade remedy 
investigation. Each stage also estimated with a constant term whose estimates are suppressed. 
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Table 7. Robustness Checks for Estimated Marginal Effects*(Second Stage of Probit Model with Selection) 
 
   
Probit Regression Equation:   
  
Dependent variable = 1  




























Size of Market Access Benefits        











Share of foreign total exports of remedy-targeted 






Growth rate of foreign total exports of remedy-
targeted products to rest of the world between 
t-1 and t+1 
0.100  
(0.064) 
-- -- -- 
Level of U.S.-imposed trade remedy  -0.662










Probability of Realizing Benefits        














Alternative Retaliation Instrument        
Share of U.S. industry level production exported to 
the foreign country 
-8.739
 a  
(2.654) 
-6.766








Capacity to Absorb Litigation Costs        
















Political Costs        
Share of total foreign aid deriving from the U.S. 
--  -0.361  
(0.256) 
-- -- 
Other Variables        
Indicator that targeted country was a member of 
the EU 
-- --  -0.110  
(0.144) 
-- 
Indicator that AD/CVD was one of multiple trade 
remedies simultaneously imposed on the same 
product 
-- --  --  0.087 
b 
(0.035) 
        
Observations in probit regression equation  149 132  132  132 
Log-likelihood  -272.44  -288.13  -241.06  -239.33 
 
Notes:  *Estimates of the Heckman selection equation are omitted, but are available from the author upon request. In parentheses are White’s heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors corrected for clustering on related AD/CVD cases, with 
a, b, and 
c denoting variables statistically different from zero at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  Time t is the year of the initiation of the trade remedy investigation. Each stage also estimated with a constant term 
whose estimates are suppressed. 